Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy / Francesco Lippi.
Material type:
TextPublication details: Northampton, Mass., USA : Edward Elgar, c1999.Description: viii, 162 p. ; 25 cmISBN: - 1858989159
- 9781858989150
- 332.1'1 22
- HG925 .L56 1999
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Monograph & others
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CBN HQ Library | 332.1'1LIP (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 31008100036975 | ||
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Monograph & others
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CBN HQ Library | 332.1'1LIP (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 31008100036983 |
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| 332.11'5493 GUN From dependent currency to central banking in Ceylon : | 332.11'669 MEM Memorandum submitted by the Central Bank of Nigeria to the Presidential Commission on parastatals / | 332.1'1LIP Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : | 332.1'1LIP Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : | 332.11’0973 FLE Greenspan's bubbles : | 332.11’0973 FLE Greenspan's bubbles : | 332.1'2 COMTH Commercial banking in a modern economy / |
Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-156) and index.
This book first integrates imperfect monetary control, rational voters and distributional issues into the analysis of inflation and monetary policy credibility, deriving implications for policy delegation to an independent central bank. In the second part, a distinction is made between central bank independence and conservatism (inflation aversion of central bank targets) to analyse the differential role played by those factors in the achivement of low inflation.
gau 23/06/14
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