Central bank independence, targets, and credibility :
Lippi, Francesco, 1968-
Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy / Francesco Lippi. - Northampton, Mass., USA : Edward Elgar, c1999. - viii, 162 p. ; 25 cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-156) and index.
This book first integrates imperfect monetary control, rational voters and distributional issues into the analysis of inflation and monetary policy credibility, deriving implications for policy delegation to an independent central bank. In the second part, a distinction is made between central bank independence and conservatism (inflation aversion of central bank targets) to analyse the differential role played by those factors in the achivement of low inflation.
1858989159 9781858989150
98031058
Monetary policy--European Union countries.
Banks and banking, Central--European Union countries.
HG925 / .L56 1999
332.1'1
Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy / Francesco Lippi. - Northampton, Mass., USA : Edward Elgar, c1999. - viii, 162 p. ; 25 cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-156) and index.
This book first integrates imperfect monetary control, rational voters and distributional issues into the analysis of inflation and monetary policy credibility, deriving implications for policy delegation to an independent central bank. In the second part, a distinction is made between central bank independence and conservatism (inflation aversion of central bank targets) to analyse the differential role played by those factors in the achivement of low inflation.
1858989159 9781858989150
98031058
Monetary policy--European Union countries.
Banks and banking, Central--European Union countries.
HG925 / .L56 1999
332.1'1