000			01745nam a22003257a 4500
008			180711b2002 dcuad gr 000 0 eng d
040			_aCBNCAT
082			_a338.91 _bLAN
100			_aLane, Timothy D.
245			_aMoral hazard : _bdoes IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? /
260			_aWashington, D.C. : _bInternational Monetary Fund, _c2002.
440			_aEconomic issues (International Monetary Fund), 28.
520			_aThe argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis
590			_aoif 11/07/2018
591			_aLoans
650			_aEconomic assistance
650			_aLoans, Foreign
650			_aCredit -- Moral and ethical aspects.
650			_aLoans -- Moral and ethical aspects.
650			_aInternational finance -- Moral and ethical aspects.
650			_aMoral hazard
650			_aCountry risk
650			_aDebts, External
650			_aEvaluation
651			_aDeveloping countries
700			_aPhillips, Steven
710			_a International Monetary Fund.
942			_2ddc _cBOOK
949			_a338.91 LAN
999			_c9141 _d9141