000 04325nam a22005295i 4500
003 DE-He213
005 20151013141925.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 150102s2015 si | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9789812873538
_9978-981-287-353-8
024 7 _a10.1007/978-981-287-353-8
_2doi
050 4 _aHG1-9999
050 4 _aHG4501-6051
050 4 _aHG1501-HG3550
072 7 _aKFF
_2bicssc
072 7 _aKFFK
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS027000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aBUS004000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a657.8333
_223
082 0 4 _a658.152
_223
100 1 _aChang, Kuo-Ping.
_eauthor.
245 1 4 _aThe Ownership of the Firm, Corporate Finance, and Derivatives
_h[electronic resource] :
_bSome Critical Thinking /
_cby Kuo-Ping Chang.
260 1 _aSingapore :
_bSpringer Singapore :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2015.
300 _aXII, 76 p. 11 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSpringerBriefs in Finance,
_x2193-1720
505 0 _aPreface -- Chapter 1: The Ownership of the Firm -- 1.1: A Story of Robin Hood -- 1.2: Power, Entrepreneur, and Objectives of the Firm -- 1.3: Choice, Risk Attitude, and Types of Contract -- References -- Chapter 2: Maximizing Profits and Maximizing Resource Providers’ Wealth -- 2.1: The Coase Theorem and the Modigliani-Miller Propositions -- 2.2: A Simple Example of the Modigliani-Miller Second Proposition -- References -- Chapter 3: A Reconsideration of the Modigliani-Miller Propositions -- 3.1: A Tale of Two Cows-The Modigliani-Miller First Proposition -- 3.2: Some Fallacious Arguments for the Modigliani-Miller Second Proposition -- References -- Chapter 4: Derivatives and the Theory of the Firm -- 4.1: Model-Free Option Prices -- 4.2: The Firm’s Resources and Derivatives -- 4.2.1: Each Resource Is Both a European Call Option and a European Put Option -- 4.2.2: Each Resource Is a Stock Plus a Forward Contract -- References -- Chapter 5: Arbitrage and Valuation of Different Contracts -- 5.1: The Arbitrage Theorem -- 5.2: Properties of the Binomial Option Pricing Model -- 5.3: Valuing Different Contracts -- Appendix A: Incomplete Market -- Appendix B: Incomplete Market and Replication of Securities -- Appendix C: More Uncertain Project and the Firm’s Value -- References -- Chapter 6: Misinterpretations of Residual Claim in Finance and Corporate Law -- 6.1: De Jure versus De Facto -- 6.2: Agency Costs and Residual Claim -- 6.3: Moral Hazard and Residual Claim -- References -- Index.
520 _aThis book clarifies several ambiguous arguments and claims in finance and the theory of the firm. It also serves as a bridge between derivatives, corporate finance and the theory of the firm. In addition to mathematical derivations and theories, the book also uses anecdotes and numerical examples to explain some unconventional concepts. The main arguments of the book are: (1) the ownership of the firm is not a valid concept, and firms’ objectives are determined by entrepreneurs who can innovate to earn excess profits; (2) the Modigliani-Miller capital structure irrelevancy proposition is a restatement of the Coase theorem, and changes in the firm’s debt-equity ratio will not affect equity-holders’ wealth (welfare), and equity-holders’ preferences toward risk (or variance) are irrelevant; (3) all firms' resources are options, and every asset is both a European call and a put option for any other asset; and (4) that a first or residual claim between debt and equity is non-existent while the first claim among fixed-income assets can actually affect the market values of these assets.
650 0 _aEconomics.
650 0 _aMicroeconomics.
650 0 _aFinance.
650 1 4 _aEconomics/Management Science.
650 2 4 _aFinance/Investment/Banking.
650 2 4 _aMicroeconomics.
650 2 4 _aFinancial Economics.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9789812873521
830 0 _aSpringerBriefs in Finance,
_x2193-1720
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-353-8
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
942 _2ddc
_cEBOOK
999 _c3509
_d3509