000			01733cam a2200277 a 4500
008			810302s1981 dcua b 000 0 eng
020			_a0844734284 (pbk.)
040			_aDLC _cDLC
050	0	0	_aHD4917 _b.H38
082	0	0	_a331.2/3 _bHAS
100	1		_aHashimoto, Masanori.
245	1	0	_aMinimum wages and on-the-job training /
260			_aWashington : _bAmerican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, _cc1981.
300			_ax, 72 p. :
440		0	_aAEI studies ;
440		0	_aStudies in economic policy
504			_aBibliography: p. 69-72.
520			_aBecker's theory of human capital predicts that minimum wages should reduce training investments for affected workers, because they prevent these workers from taking wage cuts necessary to finance training. We show that when the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets underlying this theory is relaxed, minimum wages can increase training of affected workers, by inducing firms to train their unskilled employees. More generally, a minimum wage increases training for constrained workers, while reducing it for those taking wage cuts to finance their training. We provide new estimates on the impact of the state and federal increases in the minimum wage between 1987 and 1992 of the training of low wage workers. We find no evidence that minimum wages reduce training. These results are consistent with our model, but difficult to reconcile with the standard theory of human capital.
590			_aaia 22/03/2019
591			_aLoans
650		0	_aMinimum wage.
650		0	_aEmployees
856			_uhttps://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Minimum-Wages-and-On-The-Job-Training.pdf
942			_2ddc _cBOOK
949			_a331.2'3 HAS
999			_c15353 _d15353