000			01852cam a2200313 a 4500
001			98025627
003			DLC
005			20151013135926.0
008			980522s1998 nyua b 001 0 eng
010			_a 98025627
020			_a0815331975 (alk. paper)
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dDLC
050	0	0	_aHG2563 _b.C66 1998
082	0	0	_a332.1'1'0973 _222
100	1		_aCorder, J. Kevin, _d1964-
245	1	0	_aCentral bank autonomy : _bthe Federal Reserve System in American politics / _cJ. Kevin Corder.
260			_aNew York : _bGarland Pub., _c1998.
300			_axiii, 202 p. : _bill. ; _c23 cm.
440		0	_aFinancial sector of the American economy
500			_aRevison of the author's doctoral dissertation.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 187-196) and index.
520			_aThe autonomy of the central bank in the United States is the joint product of strategic choices made by decision makers in the Fed and choices made by members of Congress. The book looks at how Fed decision makers update administrative procedure in ways that frustrate representative control of monetary policy. Members of Congress tolerate experimentation with procedures and rules because Fed independence creates an obstacle for presidents interested in controlling macroeconomic outcomes for electoral or partisan gain. Central bank autonomy is not a serious threat for members of Congress, as they independently develop a number of federal credit programs to counteract the consequences of monetary policy choices for particular sectors of the economy (notably, home construction and small business enterprise).
590			_aoif 18/07/14
591			_aLoan
610	2	0	_aBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
650		0	_aMonetary policy _zUnited States.
650		0	_aFederal Reserve banks.
942			_2ddc _cBOOK
999			_c1289 _d1289