000			01520cam a2200301 a 4500
001			98031058
003			DLC
005			20151013135919.0
008			980819s1999 mau b 001 0 eng
010			_a 98031058
020			_a1858989159
020			_a9781858989150
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dDLC
050	0	0	_aHG925 _b.L56 1999
082	0	0	_a332.1'1 _222
100	1		_aLippi, Francesco, _d1968-
245	1	0	_aCentral bank independence, targets, and credibility : _bpolitical and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy / _cFrancesco Lippi.
260			_aNorthampton, Mass., USA : _bEdward Elgar, _cc1999.
300			_aviii, 162 p. ; _c25 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 149-156) and index.
520			_aThis book first integrates imperfect monetary control, rational voters and distributional issues into the analysis of inflation and monetary policy credibility, deriving implications for policy delegation to an independent central bank. In the second part, a distinction is made between central bank independence and conservatism (inflation aversion of central bank targets) to analyse the differential role played by those factors in the achivement of low inflation.
590			_agau 23/06/14
591			_aLoans
650		0	_aMonetary policy _zEuropean Union countries.
650		0	_aBanks and banking, Central _zEuropean Union countries.
856	7		_3Table of Contents _uhttp://lcweb.loc.gov/catdir/toc/98031058.html _2http
942			_2ddc _cBOOK
999			_c1221 _d1221