000 01332pam a2200277 a 4500
008 860509s1986 ne a b 00000 eng
020 _a9024733669
020 _a9789024733668
050 0 _aHG2565
_b.C33 1986
082 0 _a332.1’12’0973
_bCEN
245 0 0 _aCentral bankers, bureaucratic incentives, and monetary policy /
260 0 _aDordrecht ;
_aBoston :
_bKluwer Academic Publishers,
_cc1986.
300 _axiv, 251 p. :
440 1 _aFinancial and monetary policy studies 13;
504 _aIncludes bibliographies.
520 _aIn recent years there has been a shift in the way economists analyze central banks. Studies in the past have assumed that the central bank acts in the interest of the public. More recently, economists have begun to question why central banks behave as they do. In addressing this question, these studies emphasize the institutional structure of central banks. The collection therein takes a look at the behavior of central banks by examining the constraints confronting bank members.
590 _anmn 30/05/13
591 _aLoans
650 0 _aMonetary policy
650 0 _aBanks and banking, Central
650 0 _aCentral banking - bureaucratic incentives
700 1 0 _aToma, Eugenia Froedge.
700 1 0 _aToma, Mark.
942 _2ddc
_cBOOK
949 _a332.1'120'0973 CEN
999 _c1054
_d1054