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Moral hazard : does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? /

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Economic issues (International Monetary Fund), 28Publication details: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002.Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 338.91 LAN
Summary: The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis
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Item type Current library Collection Call number Copy number Status Date due Barcode
Monograph & others Monograph & others CBN HQ Library General Stacks Non-fiction 338.91 LAN (Browse shelf(Opens below)) c.1 Available 31008100117486
Monograph & others Monograph & others CBN LAGOS LAISON OFFICE LIBRARY General Stacks 338.91 LAN (Browse shelf(Opens below)) c.1 Available 31008100766225

The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis

oif 11/07/2018

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