TY  - BOOK
AU  - Lippi,Francesco
TI  - Central bank independence, targets, and credibility: political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy 
SN  - 1858989159
AV  - HG925 .L56 1999
U1  - 332.1'1 22
PY  - 1999///
CY  - Northampton, Mass., USA
PB  - Edward Elgar
KW  - Monetary policy
KW  - European Union countries
KW  - Banks and banking, Central
N1  - Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-156) and index
N2  - This book first integrates imperfect monetary control, rational voters and distributional issues into the analysis of inflation and monetary policy credibility, deriving implications for policy delegation to an independent central bank. In the second part, a distinction is made between central bank independence and conservatism (inflation aversion of central bank targets) to analyse the differential role played by those factors in the achivement of low inflation
UR  - http://lcweb.loc.gov/catdir/toc/98031058.html
ER  -