Insolvency Timing and Managerial Decision-Making [electronic resource] / by Frederik Drescher.

InInsolvency Timing as an Agency Problem -- Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing.- Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision -- Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments.

Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (§ 18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. Using a decision model, the author develops the hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings and confirms it experimentally. Moreover, he analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.   Contents ·         Insolvency Timing as an Agency Problem ·         Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing ·         Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision ·         Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments       Target Groups ·         Researchers and students in the field of business economics with a focus on corporate restructuring and decision theory ·         Practitioners in corporate restructuring and insolvency professionals, managers and company owners     The Author Frederik Drescher holds a degree in Business Administration from WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management and wrote his doctoral thesis at Technische Universität München under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Gunther Friedl. He is a consultant with a special focus on corporate restructuring.